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and	considering	whether	he	wants	to	have	the	relevant	second-order	volition,	the	agent	will	consider	
whether	a	desire	for	a	desire	for	some	action	p	(or	state	of	affairs	q)	is	the	good	to	be	pursued.	But	a	
desire	for	a	desire	for	p	(or	q)	will	be	a	good	to	be	pursued	just	in	case	the	desire	for	p	(or	q)	is	a	good	
to	be	pursued,	and	that	in	turn	will	depend	on	whether	the	agent	considers	p	(or	q),	under	some	
description,	at	that	time,	a	good	to	be	pursued.	So	a	third-order	volition	that	supports	a	currently	held	
second-order	volition	is	in	effect	just	the	expression	of	a	re-evaluating	and	affirming	of	the	reasoning	
that	originally	led	to	V1.	And,	in	the	same	way,	a	third-order	volition	that	rejects	a	currently	held	
second-order	volition	will	just	be	an	expression	of	the	re-evaluation	and	rejection	of	the	reasoning	
that	led	to	the	second-order	volition.	A	third-order	volition,	then,	is	a	result	of	a	recalculation	of	the	
reasoning	that	originally	underlay	a	second-order	volition.	(Stump,	‘Sanctification,	Hardening	of	the	
Heart,	and	Frankfurt’s	Concept	of	Free	Wil’,	405)	
19
	Stump	(‘Sanctification,	Hardening	of	the	Heart,	and	Frankfurt’s	Concept	of	Free	Will’,	406)	writes	regarding	
third-order	desires,	‘There	are	also	cases	in	which	an	agent's	reasoning	is	confused	and	warrants	conflicting	
second-order	desires.	An	agent	who	notices	such	a	conflict	in	his	second-order	desires	and	who	reflects	on	it	
may	then	sort	out	the	confusion	in	his	reasoning	and	form	a	third-order	volition	in	consequence.’	
20
	See	Efird	and	Worsley,	‘Critical	Review	of	Eleonore	Stump’s	Wandering	in	Darkness:	Narrative	and	the	
Problem	of	Suffering’	547-8.	We	argue	that	justification	and	sanctification	refer	to	two	aspects	of	the	same	
continuous	process,	namely,	the	integration	of	all	second-order	desires	around	a	second-order	volition	for	
union	with	God,	and	the	alignment	of	first-	and	second-order	volitions.	The	process	of	justification	prompts	a	
(non-wholehearted)	second-order	volition	for	union	with	God.	The	process	of	sanctification	integrates	other	
second-order	desires	around	the	second-order	volition	of	justification,	as	well	as	strengthening	this	second-
order	volition	so	as	to	ensure	first-order	volitions	align	with	it.	We	conclude	that	union	with	God	requires	
acting	upon	a	wholehearted	second-order	volition,	and	the	completion	of	this	two-part	process	is	the	only	
mechanism	by	which	this	can	happen	in	a	fallen	person.	
